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This study investigates the nexus between the mass movement of people and security and 
foreign policy behaviors. The assertion is that refugee flows intensify security issues among 
decision makers and members of society; consequently, new fears and wider perceptions of 
threats have several implications for foreign policy agenda. The article focuses on the 
theoretical analysis of the securitization of migration and its impact on foreign policy and 
security policy. It also analyzes, from a security perspective, the effect on Turkey of the 
refugees who arrived en masse from Syria during the past six years. The article concludes 
with an analysis of the social, economic, security, and foreign policy effects the refugees have 
had on Turkey. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
What security means has been a contentious issue in the international relations (IR) 
literature. The traditional structural realism or neorealist understanding of the international 
system represented by Kenneth Waltz emphasizes the roles played by international anarchy 
and the importance of a balance of power.1 In this picture of an anarchic competitive 
international system, real politik adjustments may be common as states seek to defend their 
own interests, making and remaking alliances and agreements to suit their own sovereign 
interests. Thus, balance of power considerations and shifts can trigger negative responses 
among states, mutually reinforcing themselves in a negative downward spiral.2 
Since the end of the Cold War, debates about security have expanded the level of 
analysis. Even if the nation-state remains a privileged object of IR analysis, issues involving 
security are increasingly creating interconnections among domestic, regional, and global 
scenes. This academic debate has facilitated a wider interpretation of security questions, 
including nonmilitary dimensions of security. These developments show vividly that there 
exists a multitude of factors coming from critical social movements and other political actors 
that have revitalized state and global security issues.3 In addition, among these, migration, 
forced and voluntary, could be categorized as a security threat to the extent that host societies 
would perceive it as a challenge to individual, group, or national identity.4 
Academic interest in the relationship between the international movement of people and 
world politics has been growing since the early 1990s. The sources, causes, and consequences 
of international migrations have been studied using various methodologies and approaches. 
These can be summarized in two large categories: migration studies and IR/security studies. 
The latter literature presents different models for understanding the securitization of 
migration—also called “securitized migration”—from three IR schools of thought (realism, 
liberalism, and constructivism), including the securitization theory (ST), which provides the 
most applied and developed model of the nature and mechanism of the securitization of 
migration.5 
As demonstrated by several studies, large-scale mass movements of people across the 
globe clearly pose a threat to human, state, and societal security.6 Refugee flows have  
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generated a mixture of humanitarian concern for the millions of people forced into exile and 
fear for the potential threat to the social, economic, and political stability of host states. 
Gil Loescher stresses that too often refugees are perceived as a matter for international 
charity organizations and not as a political and security problem. But, he points out, refugee 
problems are intensely political, and it is necessary, therefore, to see refugees not only as a 
humanitarian problem but as a political problem, particularly in terms of security.7 Refugee 
flows are a source of international, mainly regional, conflict because they cause instability 
among neighboring countries.8 Thus, the host state is torn between humanitarian concern for 
refugees and immigrant communities, and awareness that refugees can be a source of tension 
and instability within the state and with neighboring countries. 
 
The Concept of Security in the Turkish Scenario 
During the past ten years, Turkey has transformed from a transit country to a target country 
for immigrants, a shift that has been accompanied by a Europeanization process and a general 
alignment with international norms and standards. As a consequence of this new trend, 
Turkey has experienced increased security risks, which have enhanced its traditional sense of 
insecurity. 
Historically, Turkish security was concentrated on military power and territorial defense 
(hard security). Turkey’s security conceptualization is shaped by its geopolitical and 
geostrategic location, which provides a unique position in world politics and vulnerabilities.9 
With the end of the Cold War and the deep domestic transformation during the late 1980s—
economic, social, political, and cultural—a much broader and more complex security agenda 
emerged in Turkey.10 It was characterized by the reduced value and importance of military 
power and increased soft security considerations concentrated on issues such as economic 
and social conditions. As argued by Mustafa Aydin and Asli Toksabay Esen, Turkey was not 
immune to systemic changes in international relations at the end of the Cold War. Its “hard 
and soft security issues transcend boundaries and build a dense network of bridges between 
the ‘domestic’ and the ‘foreign.’”11 Moreover, Turkey experienced the increasing role and 
influence of public opinion on the changing security concerns of the country. 
A turning point was the victory election of the Justice and Development Party (JDP) in 
2002.12 The JDP is a religiously and socially conservative but economically globalist single-
party government, which has different conceptions of security, perceptions of insecurity, and 
priorities in policy making. The JDP rise resulted in harsh criticism of the traditional hard-
security agenda, which was replaced by a new spectrum of soft-security issues that focus on 
economic, cultural, and humanitarian issues.13 
Although the security understanding in Turkey favors the traditional definition, new 
areas such as economic challenges, demographic and social trends, and environmental 
problems have increasingly appeared in the discussion around security. This development has 
been driven by Turkish civil society, which became increasingly conscious of new 
transnational issues, including migration flows.14 The globalization process boosted the 
movement of people along with goods, technologies, ideas, and finance; moreover, increasing 
economic prosperity and political stability attracted temporary and permanent people to work, 
study, and live in Turkey. In such an environment, over the past several years, an explosion 
has occurred in the number of asylum seekers from Syria and other countries, such as Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Somalia. 
 
The War in Syria and the Refugee Crisis: An Overview 
When pro-democracy protests began in Syria, Turkey adopted a cautious approach, trying to 
mediate among the Bashar al-Assad regime, opposition factions, and other regional actors. 
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But after a brutal crackdown on protesters, Ankara progressively distanced itself from the 
Assad regime, calling for Bashar al-Assad’s ouster. By the fall of 2011, Turkey pursued the 
idea of creating a buffer zone or a no-fly zone to protect civilians and support anti-Assad 
rebels. Hosting unprecedented numbers of Syrian refugees forced Turkey to adopt a strong 
humanitarian approach but also a foreign policy line that was strategic and security-oriented. 
In doing that, Turkey has pursued two aims: overthrowing Assad’s regime and ensuring the 
continuation of a territorially integrated Syrian state to prevent the creation of an independent 
Kurdish state along its southern borders.15 
Since the first months of the Syrian civil conflict, Turkey’s attitude toward refugees has 
been closely intertwined with its foreign policy strategy. As Kemal Kirişçi points out, 
“Turkey’s expectation . . . was that the Assad regime would not last long. It was against such 
a background that Turkey declared in October 2011 an open-door policy towards refugees 
fleeing Syria.”16 Turkey mistakenly assumed that the Assad regime would soon collapse and 
refugees would return to Syria. In this belief, Turkey shifted from a security-centered 
approach to an initial morality-oriented approach. It was widely suspected that the rationale 
for Turkey’s initial generosity toward Syrians and the nonregistration of Syrian refugees was 
related to Turkey’s support of the Syrian opposition. It was also claimed that much of the 
help to the opposition was channeled through human rights organizations.17 
Since the early stages of the Syrian conflict, Turkey has followed an open-door policy, 
avoiding the use of securitization of the refugee movement and without asking for burden 
sharing. The Turkish Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) has been the 
lead agency in coordinating the government’s efforts to respond to the refugee inflow in 
cooperation with other international organizations, including Turkish and non-Turkish 
NGOs.18 Initially, the influx of refugees from Syria was relatively small. At the end of 2011, 
there were almost 8,000 recognized refugees in Turkey. Inflows gained momentum in 2012 
as the conflict worsened, and by the end of the year there were more than 170,000 registered 
refugees. By the end of 2013, Turkey started to seek cooperation with international 
organizations, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and 
asked for more contributions from UN programs, such as the Syria Regional Response Plan. 
Starting in 2014, Turkey tightened measures that were implemented for security reasons. 
Likewise, registration of Syrian refugees and an unofficial closed-door policy was adopted 
because of (1) policy changes toward the Syria crisis, (2) the high number of displaced people 
crossing the border, (3) Turkey’s lack of capacity to respond to the needs of the influx, and 
(4) uncertainty about the expected length of time of the crisis. 
According to UNHRC, as of April 2018, 3,584,179 Syrian refugees were registered in 
Turkey.19 Thus, Turkey has become the leading country in accepting refugees from Syria and 
the largest refugee-hosting country in the world. Turkey hosts refugees in refugee camps and 
in the cities, mostly those that border Syria.20 AFAD continues to provide services 
(accommodation, health, education, religious, and social services) in twenty-three refugee 
camps, with a total capacity of almost 300,000. Although refugees from Syria who live inside 
camps have better conditions, approximately 85 to 90 percent of them live outside camps. 
While the camps are managed and resourced, the noncamp refugee population experiences 
significant capacity problems, bureaucratic hurdles (housing, food, education, and health 
services), legal obstacles, and issues related to employment. Some of the critical challenges 
and areas of intervention that remain include protecting the legal, physical, and psychological 
rights of refugees, finding adequate shelter and providing services, and delivering social 
services (health and education).21 
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Legal Framework 
Originally these refugees were considered guests, rather than legal refugees, because of the 
legal framework for migrant and asylum seekers in Turkey. The legal framework was 
constituted by the Settlement Law (1934),22 the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees (1951), and the Additional Protocol (1967). A significant fact is that Turkey ratified 
the Refugee Convention (1951) but has applied it with a geographical limitation that grants 
asylum status only to Europeans.23 Thus, most non-European asylum seekers are still not 
entitled to stay in Turkey, even after gaining recognized refugee status through UNHCR. 
The term “guest,” however, has no place in international refugee law. As a result, Turkey 
has prepared new administrative and legal documents, including a “temporary protection 
regime (TP).”24 This regime has been applied to all Syrians, Palestinians, and stateless 
persons living in Syria. The refugees were admitted and accommodated, and still are, through 
the TP, which was introduced in October 2011 and reinforced with a legal base and clarity by 
the Turkish Parliament, which adopted the Law on Foreigners and International Protection 
(LFIP) in April 2013.25 
The most important aspect of the LFIP is the clear definition of refugees’ legal status that 
is shown by their identity cards, their rights, and the acquired social support. Article 91 of the 
LFIP defines “temporary protection” as a protection status granted to foreigners who, having 
been forced to leave their country and cannot return, have arrived in Turkey seeking 
emergency and temporary protection. It provides the Syrians with the right to temporary 
asylum, until they are resettled in a safe, third country.26 Moreover, the law marked a shift 
from the previous security-oriented approach to a more human rights–oriented view of 
immigration. This framework has been fortified by another directive adopted by the Council 
of Ministers and entered into force in October 2014 that specifies the terms of protection and 
strengthens rights and approaches. It involves (1) an open-door policy, (2) non-refoulement, 
(3) registration with the Turkish authorities, and (4) support inside the borders of the camps. 
Nevertheless, the temporary protection status precludes permanent settlement in Turkey. 
Along with legal developments, Turkish authorities also established informal 
approaches, providing support to Turkish NGOs that manage some camps beyond the border 
(zero-point delivery system) to prevent new arrivals. At the same time, border authorities 
employ a policy of “passage with careful control” intended to restrict the number of entries 
but also used to control the arrival of particular ethnic, national, religious, and ideological 
groups. According to the Amnesty International annual report of 2014, this selective policy 
contradicts the TP regime and international law that prohibits return of refugees to a territory 
where their lives or their freedom is threatened. 
In sum, the Turkish government has carried out a policy toward Syria that is based not on 
a discourse of rights but on generosity. Such a charitable approach rather than a rights-based 
approach risks feeding a negative public opinion in Turkey toward refugees. 
 
The Implications for Turkey 
Even if Turkey has taken serious steps to enhance its response to the growing influx of 
refugees from Syria, it will continue to face social, ethnic, sectarian, and demographic 
pressures created by the largest refugee flow in the country’s modern history. Moreover, 
initially, the refugees’ presence was considered temporary; but now it has become a 
permanent, or at least a long-term, presence. This lasting situation has had several tangible 
and psychological effects on the Turkish state and society. The effects of the refugees’ influx 
into Turkey can be categorized and examined in relation to the economy, social life, security, 
and foreign policy. 
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Effects on Economy 
Generally, in host countries, refugees are considered a burden on economic resources, and 
even a potential for real danger. An examination of the economic effects on Turkey, however, 
shows that risks and opportunities are intertwined. 
Beyond the roughly eight billion dollars Turkey has spent providing a home for these 
refugees, the economic impact has been noteworthy.27 The influx of refugees has caused an 
increase in demand in all cities that has led to increases in rental prices and in the cost of 
living. Finding affordable accommodation has become increasingly difficult for renters. In 
some instances, landlords forced Turkish tenants to leave so they could rent to Syrians at 
higher prices. Another sensitive issue linked to the influx from Syria is the illegal use of 
Syrian workers as cheap labor in industry, agriculture, and small business sectors. The 
general perception in Turkish border cities is that Syrians are stealing jobs from local people. 
Moreover, the financial cost of the upkeep of the refugee camps has had a strong, negative 
impact on the public’s perception, triggering social tension or disturbances against the 
refugees in several local communities.28 
Despite these negative aspects, there are some positive effects of the Syrian presence. 
The living expenses Syrians pay and the cheap labor they provide cannot be ignored. Though 
the international community provides some humanitarian aid, much of the aid is supplied by 
local firms. This situation creates economic opportunities, especially in textiles and 
agriculture. Furthermore, among the Syrian refugees are business owners and investors, some 
of whom, mainly from Aleppo, have strong networks and relationships within the Middle 
East that have helped facilitate the distribution of Turkish products in the region. Also, 
investments by Syrians have transferred billions of dollars to Europe through Greek and 
Cypriot banks.29 
 
Social Effects 
Women and girls who fled Syria alone or with their children are vulnerable to sexual and 
verbal abuse. A common practice in the Turkish border provinces has been the marriage 
between Turkish men and young Syrian women. These are often forced marriages and many 
of the brides are minors. A market has developed surrounding these arranged marriages, 
which have been associated with child abuse, polygamy, and increased divorce. In addition, 
women who have crossed the border illegally are at high risk of being kidnapped and sold as 
prostitutes or sex slaves.30 
Another social issue caused by the growing presence of refugee populations is child 
labor. Syrian parents often send their children to work rather than to school, and the Turkish 
government and NGOs have been unable to offer sufficient education to counteract this 
practice. Partly as a result of the lack of a male breadwinner, more and more Syrian children 
are going to work at an early age to support themselves and their families.31 Often boys and 
girls start work when they are as young as six or seven. Further, Syrian women and children 
in Turkey also experience sexual harassment at work. 
 
Security Policy 
The rapid and constant flow of refugees has caused feelings of insecurity among local 
communities and has transformed the ethnic balance in southern Turkish provinces such as 
Hatay and Mardin.32 The demographic change is also driven by high birth rates among 
refugees, suggesting that there will be a second generation of Syrian refugees in Turkey that 
will further shift ethnic and sectarian balances. Moreover, the long-lasting negative impact of 
increasing social tensions will drive future vulnerability. 
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The demographic characteristics, especially the ethnic component, of the host city or 
province determine the relations between hosting community and refugees.33 In some 
instances, conflict is highly likely. For example, historically, Turkey’s southeastern region 
has presented fault lines similar to the ones that erupted in the Syrian civil conflict. The fact 
that most refugees from Syria are Sunni is changing the demographic mosaic of many border 
cities and exacerbating the two main potentially dangerous conflict dimensions. One is ethnic 
(Turks-Arabs-Kurds) and the other is religious (Sunnis-Alevis-Alawis). Despite ethnic 
differences among Syrian refugees, the overwhelmingly majority are Sunni Arabs. Thus, the 
danger to domestic security is threefold: the presence of these refugees reproduces social and 
political tensions among different Syrian groups on Turkish soil, triggering long-dormant 
sectarian tensions among Turkish citizens, and fostering in the local community the sense that 
they are now the minority in their homeland. Furthermore, tension and distrust are 
exacerbated by fears of the rise of militants among the refugees, particularly because Syrian 
opposition groups are known to operate from southern Turkey.34 
The situation, therefore, in some border provinces has been perceived and interpreted by 
the Turkish government as a threat to its national security. Accordingly, Ankara has taken 
steps to ward off the danger of sectarian clashes. Since September 2012, Turkey has been 
steering away from settling large numbers of Syrian refugees in southern cities, redirecting 
many of them to interior provinces.35 Another step has been a general militarization of the 
borders, which also signifies the insertion of the refugee issue into a security framework that 
emphasizes policing and defense. In other words, Turkey has gradually securitized its 
southern border. 
 
Foreign Policy 
Turkey’s foreign policy objective to be a regional and global power shaped its response to the 
refugee flow. Turkey’s shift from a security-centered approach to a morality-oriented 
approach seems to be related to its assertive agenda regarding the Syrian crisis. This shift 
occurred because it was specious for Turkey to present itself at once as a powerful country in 
its neighborhood, as a regional mediator, and as a contributor to the solution of humanitarian 
problems through diplomacy and efficient crisis management. Thus, an evident trend is the 
close link between Turkey’s involvement in the Syrian civil conflict and Turkey’s domestic 
policy toward refugees. Moreover, Turkey has, on several occasions and in different ways, 
politically instrumentalized the refugee crisis. Frequently, the Turkish government has 
attempted to compare its strategy in Syria with the interests of the refugees. One example is 
Turkey’s international demand to set up a no-fly, or buffer, zone in the north of Syria.36 
Another foreign policy effect of the refugee crisis has been the rapprochement with the 
European Union (EU) after years of cooling. The EU-Turkey deals reached on November 29, 
2015, and March 18, 2016, raised Turkey’s strategic importance to a whole new level. The 
chaotic arrival in Europe of more than a million refugees in 2015 transformed the European 
political landscape. The refugee exodus and the terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels have 
already changed European priorities in the Middle East to focus on two issues: avoiding new 
large-scale refugee flows and eliminating the Daesh threat and terror networks linked to it.37 
Turkey’s strategic importance as a gateway to the Middle East has never been greater. 
Turkey is the only convenient springboard for massive emigration from the Middle East to 
Europe. The consideration of mutual interests the EU and Turkey have pursued through 
cooperation on the refugee crisis has become increasingly important. In exchange for taking 
in refugees, Turkey has re-energized talks on its EU membership. 
One provision of the EU-Turkey refugee deal is that Turkey will send back migrants who 
cross the Aegean Sea to Greece if they do not apply for asylum or if their claim is rejected.38 
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In exchange, the European Union has agreed to resettle up to seventy-two thousand Syrian 
refugees directly from Turkey, speed up financial aid (six billion euros by the end of 2018), 
and lift visa requirements for Turkish citizens. The deal has been criticized by aid agencies as 
inhumane.39 The UNHCR has said that big questions remain about how the deal will work in 
practice and has called for urgent improvements to Greece’s system for assessing refugees. 
Moreover, several doubts are surfacing about how the three to six billion euros the European 
Union has allocated for support in Turkey will be spent. 
In sum, Turkey is a key strategic and political player in resolving the crises provoked by 
the Syrian civil war. There is no doubt that Europe should engage Turkey. But, as A. K. Han 
has argued, it should do so with an honest approach and a constructive and comprehensive 
agenda leading to the sustainable resumption of the process that would also provide a solution 
to the human tragedy stemming from Syria.40 
Another effect on Turkey’s foreign policy is that Turkish humanitarian efforts have 
rehabilitated the country’s international image, after some events that had damaged her 
reputation, mainly in the Muslim world.41 The political discourse toward Syrians in Turkey 
also considers them as “guests” and “brothers and sisters of faith,” thus legitimizing their 
settlement. Thanks to this kind of morality-oriented policy toward refugees and asylum 
seekers from Syria, Turkey continues to enjoy popularity in the less-developed countries, 
despite the erosion of its international image due to such internal events as the Gezi Park 
protests, Twitter and YouTube bans, and the Kurdish question. 
 
Conclusion 
The lack of precedence for the Syrian refugee crisis has made it difficult for Turkey to handle 
it politically and financially. As this article shows, the refugee situation in Turkey has 
become a security issue with economic, social, and political effects. As the humanitarian 
crisis enters its fifth year, general dissatisfaction and disappointment exists within Turkey 
regarding the international community’s efforts to help with the country’s refugee challenge. 
UNHCR remains the most important organization representing the international community 
in Turkey, and though cooperation with AFAD has grown recently, the general perception of 
it in Turkey remains very negative. 
Turkey has limited resources and faces its own economic challenges. Consequently, the 
joint action plan with EU offers some relief through a reduction of costs. Furthermore, the 
controversial EU-Turkey migration deal could be the first step toward a more comprehensive 
strategy that would lead to better collaboration among states, international organizations, and 
NGOs to resolve the Syrian crisis. 
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